This study aimed to get empirical evidence about the influence of ownership structure cross listed company on earnings management with the legal system as a moderating variable in the relationship between ownership structure cross listed company and discretionary accruals earnings management model Jones Modified. This research was carried out by using a sample of fifty Asian companies listed on the New York Stock Exchange (NYSE) in 2011-2013. One indicator of corporate performance assessment is the amount of compensation received by the manager, where this can be the motivation of earnings management action. Earnings management measures can be minimized by monitoring the management by using the proportion of ownership by outsiders in the company. For companies listed on foreign capital markets, the legal system of a country believed to be able to strengthen the company's ownership structure influence on earnings management measures for countries with good legal system is able to minimize the likelihood of earnings management action. Earnings management is measured using the modified Jones models with discretionary accruals as a proxy for earnings management. Statistical test equipment used in this research is multiple regression. This study obtained evidence that the structure of institutional ownership cross listed company has a significant negative effect on discretionary accruals earnings management, while the legal system is not able to moderate the influence of ownership structure cross listed company on discretionary accruals earnings management of the company. This occurs because the NYSE stock market is in a country with strong investor protection that the legal system of the Asian company is not able to strengthen the influence of ownership structure on earnings management action.